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Laboratory Animal Act: A Legislative
Proposal
David Favre*
I. Introduction
In one recent experiment, mongrel dogs were anesthetized
after which thirty-five percent of their body was burned to the
third degree by the application of a two hundred degree centi-
grade hot plate to their skin.' In 1983, researchers at the New
Jersey Medical School placed electrodes in the hippocampus
portion of the brains of five female cats. The brain was stimu-
lated with electrical current to determine whether or not there
was an increase in the tendency of the cat to bite at an anes-
thetized rat.' Researchers at Georgia State University divided
a group of ten infant chimpanzees into pairs and triads. Two
weeks later the pairs were split and one from each of the tri-
ads was isolated. The study was designed to measure the de-
gree of "protest" behavior and the reunion responses. In the
researcher's own words, "the results of this study indicated
that chimpanzees react in predictable ways to separation from
cage mates.., the data on separation of chimpanzees are in-
termediate between those of humans and monkeys.""
The above examples of animal use are neither unique nor
isolated. Are they examples of the incremental steps necessary
* Professor David S. Favre teaches at the Detroit College of Law in Detroit,
Michigan. He is a national board member of the Animal Legal Defense Fund and has
written on a number of animal related topics.
1. Animal Welfare Institute, Beyond -the Laboratory Door 140 (1985) (citing
Wolfe, Effect of Thermal Injury on Energy Metabolism, Substrate Kinetics, and
Hormonal Concentrations, 9 Circulatory Shock 383 (1982)).
2. Id. at 183-84 (citing Watson, An Analysis of the Mechanics Underlying Hip-
pocamal Control of Hypothalamically-elicited Agression in the Cat, 269 Brain Re-
search 327 (1983)).
3. Id. at 229-30 (citing Bard & Nadler, The Effect of Peer Separation in Young
Chimpanzees, 5 Am. J. of Primatology 25 (1983)).
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for the advancement of science or are they unjustified inflic-
tion of pain and suffering best characterized as torture? The
application of a hot plate or the use of electricity on a living
animal by a person would, in a different circumstance, most
likely violate state cruelty laws.4 Presently, within our society,
there is a wide range of perspectives on this issue. Some indi-
viduals believe any use of animals in experiments is ethically
unacceptable regardless of the human motivation.5 Others
would leave such decisions entirely in the hands of the scien-
tist, behind the laboratory door. Still others would argue that
while the use of animals may be necessary for science, there is
presently too much wastefulness, too much repetition, and
that it is unacceptable to inflict pain and suffering on
animals.7
To pursue these ethical issues requires the opening of the
historically closed laboratory door to public and governmental
observation. Most reflective people are willing to agree that
animals should not suffer pain needlessly.8 The key issue has
4. See State v. Tweedie, 444 A.2d 855 (R.I. 1982) (upholding a conviction for
cruelly killing where the defendant put a cat in a microwave oven and turned it on);
Anderton v. State, 390 So. 2d 1083 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (in which the defendant
was convicted of killing, by burning with gasoline, three two-week-old puppies).
5. One organization against all use of animals in research is the International
Society for Animal Rights. The organization recently announced, "ISAR is willing
and eager to work with other organizations of a like mind in a vigorous campaign
against experimentation on animals." Int'l Soc'y for Animal Rights Rep., Editorial:
Startergy and Pressure Points 2 (Aug. 1985) (available from International Society for
Animal Rights, Inc., 421 South State Street, Clarks Summit, Pa. 18411).
6. In testimony before Congress, Dr. Walter Randall representing the American
Physiological Society stated, "[tihe society maintains its position that restrictive leg-
islation is not needed." Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act: Hearings
on S. 657 Before Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, & Forestry, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
48 (1983).
7. The Scientists Center for Animal Welfare, established in 1979,
is dedicated to the principle that a humane concern for animals should be
incorporated into our conduct of science. The Scientists Center's outlook is
one of responsible inquiry - seeking the best possible reconciliation of human
needs with concern for the needs and well-being of all other animals. The
Center recognizes that there is a need for the use of live animals in biomedi-
cal research and holds that high standards of animal welfare complement the
quality of scientific results.
Scientists Center for Animal Welfare, Brochure (1985-1986).
8. In a statement made before the House of Representatives one of the Associate
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol3/iss2/1
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always been who should decide when pain is necessary, and in
accordance with what standards is the decision to be made.
Today, as in the past, individual scientists make the decision
on a case by case basis with some oversight by a peer review
process. The government has bowed to the demands of re-
search scientists who wish to be free in their choice of re-
search technique. 9 Would the imposition of government regu-
lation be constitutional? Would government regulation stifle
scientific research, killing the golden goose?
This article proposes new legislation which would reduce
the pain and suffering of animals to a minimum while al-
lowing maximum flexibility for the researcher. The primary
legal mechanism for accomplishing this goal is a federal per-
mit system. Under this system, rather than trying to control
all animal research, permits will be required only for specifi-
cally listed techniques which produce pain and suffering in
animals and any use of primates.
Before describing the specific provisions of my Labora-
tory Animal Act (LAA), some background may be useful.
First, a brief examination of present laws will show how little
Directors of the National Institute of Health said:
In appearance before this panel last October, I said, "It is almost impos-
sible to exaggerate the importance of laboratory animals in the search for
new or improved means to prevent, treat and cure human disease. Virtually
every major advance in health care stems in whole or in part from research
performed with animals."
Such research is essential if we are to continue to make progress toward
overcoming such maladies as cancer, heart disease, diabetes, brain dysfunc-
tion and environmentally caused disorders.
At the same time, Mr. Chairman, I emphasized that the social imperative
that calls for the use of animals in research "is not a license to take animals'
lives needlessly, or to inflict pain and suffering that could reasonably be
avoided. Abuse of laboratory animals is as inconsistent with good science as
it is with good conscience."
I believe that the vast majority of the scientific community and the gen-
eral public shares that view.
Humane Care and Development of Substitutes for Animals in Research Act:
Hearings on H.R. 6245 Before the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology
of the Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982) (testimony of
William F. Raub).
9. See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text. The constitutionality of the
proposed act will be considered.
1986]
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regulation exists to govern the use of animals for scientific
purposes. Second, a legal frame of reference for the regulation
of scientific experimentation will be developed. Third, an ethi-
cal perspective for animals will be considered.
II. Present Legal Structures
A. State Regulation of Experimentation on Animals
Current law regards animals as personal property. Under
state law their status as living personal property is recog-
nized, 10 and a minimum standard of humane care is generally
provided for. The starting point for analysis is the state cru-
elty law. 1 These criminal law provisions, with roots back into
the 1880's and 1890's, contain general language which apply to
human conduct but usually make no specific reference to the
use of animals in the laboratory."2 In a majority of states,
there is no exception or special provision for the use of ani-
mals in research and testing.' s While phrases such as "tor-
ture", "unjustifiably injure", and "cruelly beat or needlessly
10. "A dog, for all its admirable and unique qualities, is not a human being and
is not treated in the law as such. A dog is personal property, ownership of which is
recognized under the law." Arrington v. Arrington, 613 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1981).
Animals are a unique classification of personal property in that they have the
ability to move of their own volition; they will, with a certain regularity, pro-
duce more of the same; they require care. In sum, they are alive, and being so
gives rise to several unique considerations within personal property law....
All animals within the boundaries of the United States are in theory the
property of either a private individual (any legal entity) or the state.
D. Favre & M. Loring, Animal Law 21 (1983).
11. For a full analysis of typical state cruelty laws, see D. Favre & M. Loring,
Animal Law 121-66 (1983).
12. For example, the Mississippi cruelty law remains today basically the same as
it was when initially passed in 1880. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-41-1 (1973 & Supp. 1985).
13. A 1984 survey found that in twenty-three states research received some level
of protection from the general application of state cruelty laws. Assoc. for Biomedical
Research, State Laws Concerning the Use of Animals in Research 13-15 (1st ed. 1984)
(available from Association of Biomedical Research, 400-2 Totten Pond Rd., Suite
200, Waltham, Mass. 02154). A student review of the various statutes suggests that
thirty-four states have rejected the use of an express exemption of researchers from
cruelty statutes. Note, Taub v. State: Are State Anti-Cruelty Statutes Sleeping Gi-
ants? 2 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 255, 268 (1984).
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mutilate" often appear in state criminal law," it is difficult to
apply such general terms to the specific activities of a scien-
tist. What is clearly cruel or unjustifiable to one person, such
as the intentional burning of the skin of guinea pigs,'5 is not
to another. The end result is that state cruelty laws have had
negligible impact on the activities of science and animal test-
ing. In fact, there is only one recorded case of a scientist being
charged and convicted under a state cruelty law, and in that
case the conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland.'0
The cruelty laws of a number of states, such as Virginia 7
and California, "s provide a simple exemption for scientific re-
search. Other states, such as Michigan and Massachusetts,
have set up affirmative provisions governing some aspect of
the use of animals in research. Michigan has created an
animal research advisory board within the Department of
Health.'9 This board may "establish standards... controlling
the humane use of animals."20 The regulations adopted in
Michigan focus on the appropriate use of drugs and the post
experimental care of animals. Incorporated into the regula-
tions by reference is the Guide for the Care and Use of Labo-
ratory Animals.2' While this guide is eighty-one pages long, it
14. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 97-41-1 (1973 & Supp. 1985).
15. Animal Welfare Institute, supra note 1, at 136-40.
16. Taub v. State, 296 Md. 439, 463 A.2d 819 (1983). Edward Taub was con-
ducting research on monkeys which entailed surgically abolishing all sensation in the
limb of a monkey (deafferentation). He was found guilty of failure to provide neces-
sary veterinary care, but this conviction was overturned when the highest court in
Maryland, in a very unclear opinion, held that the legislature had not meant for the
general cruelty statute to apply to scientific research even though no language could
be found in the statute supporting this conclusion. See, Note, supra note 13, at 255.
17. The general cruelty language is qualified by the phrase "not connected with
bona fide scientific or medical experimentation." Of course, there is no hint as to
what makes something "bona fide." Va. Code § 29-213.91 (1985).
18. The phrase in the California Code is "or with properly conducted scientific
experiments or investigations performed under the authority of the faculty of a regu-
larly incorporated medical college or university of this state." Cal. Penal Code
§ 599(c) (West 1970).
19. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2672 (West 1980).
20. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2673 (West 1980). The regulations are located
in Mich Admin. Code R. § 325.921-.926 (1980).
21. Public Health Service National Institutes of Health, U.S. Dep't of Health &
19861
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does not provide much in the way of detailed standards of
care for animals. The primary focus is on the housing of ani-
mals rather than the scientific techniques or procedures which
may be used in experiments. The Michigan regulations, which
cover all vertebrate animals, do require inspections on an an-
nual basis22
In 1983, Massachusetts passed a new law which allows the
commissioner of the Department of Public Health to adopt
regulations for the licensing and inspection of research insti-
tutions that use dogs and cats.2 The regulations adopted by
the state are very close to the national regulations adopted
under the federal Animal Welfare Act.
24
B. Federal Regulation of Experimentation on Animals
At the federal level there is one primary law which di-
rectly affects the conditions of animals in a laboratory: the
Animal Welfare Act.2 5 Although extensive regulations have
been adopted by the Department of Agriculture, 6 the concern
is upon the housing of animals rather than what is done to the
animal by the scientist. For example, the law requires mini-
mum standards for food, water, sanitation, ventilation, shelter
and veterinary care.27 The law does require the use of pain-
relieving drugs when pain is present but also provides a large
loophole by further stating that such drugs need not be used
if their use would interfere with the purpose of the experi-
ment.2 This situation is precisely what Congress desired.
During the congressional debate it was made clear that there
Human Services, Pub. No. 85-23, Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals
(1985).
22. "'Animal' means any living, vertebrate animal." Mich. Admin. Code R.
§ 325.921(1)(a) (1980).
23. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 140 § 174 D (West Supp. 1986).
24. Mass. Admin. Code tit. 105 §§ 910.001-.210 (1984).
25. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2157 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
26. 9 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-3.142 (1986).
27. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a) (1982).
28. "[I]n any practice which could cause pain to animals ... the withholding of
tranquilizers, anesthesia, or euthanasia when scientifically necessary shall continue
for only the necessary period of time.... 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3) (1982), amended by 7
U.S.C.S. § 2143(a)(3)(C)(i-v) (Law. Co-op 1985 & Supp. 1986).
[Vol. 3
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was to be no interference with research and experimenta-
tion.2 9 Congress did not seek to distinguish between interfer-
ing with scientific research and controlling the methods used
in doing research.
Not only is the Animal Welfare Act limited in the activi-
ties that it covers, but it is also limited by its definition of the
term "animal". The law itself lists specific animals (dogs, cats,
primates, etc.) and then allows the Secretary of Agriculture to
designate other warm blooded animals.30 The same subsection
of the law, however, excludes all farm animals used in food
and fiber research from the protection of the law. A further
narrowing occurs in the regulations. The Secretary specifically
excludes birds, rats and mice in the regulatory definition of
"animal"." Ironically, these species represent the three most
used species in research and testing.32 Thus, existing federal
law provides animals with protection only in the area of hous-
ing, and some of the species receive no protection at all.
Although not part of any law, there is normally a peer
review process both at the institution where research occurs
and during the grant review when N.I.H. grants are involved.
Undoubtedly, some concern is given to animals and their pain
and suffering during these reviews, but the published litera-
ture continues to show the use of experimental techniques
ethically unacceptable to many.3 Additionally, it may be pre-
sumed that a number of lesser quality research projects in-
volving great pain and suffering to animals are either never
29. For example, consider the commentary of Senator Monroney:
Let me make it crystal clear that this bill in no way will impair the rights of
researchers and the managers of research facilities to subject animals to med-
ical or surgical procedures required for research and experimentation. ...
The researcher is left completely free to use an animal in his research project
in whatever way, no matter how painful, and for as long as he deems neces-
sary, including removing any organs or vital parts, or even experimentation
that he knows will result in the death of the animal.
112 Cong. Rec. S13893 (daily ed. June 22, 1966). See also 112 Cong. Rec. H9210
(daily ed. April 28, 1966) (statement of Rep. Pepper).
30. 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (1982).
31. 9 C.F.R. § 1.1(n) (1986).
32. See infra note 49.
33. See generally Animal Welfare Institute, supra note 1, at 121-250 (for a re-
view of the scientific literature).
1986]
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written up or never accepted for publication and thus remain
totally hidden from the public.
At the moment neither the state nor the federal laws di-
rectly address the issue of when, if ever, it is appropriate to
intentionally inflict pain and suffering on animals under the
argued need of scientific research. It is now time to develop a
legal framework in which it is possible to control or regulate
the use of animals by science. It is such a legal framework
which is being proposed herein.
III. The Regulation of Science
Science, both as a truth seeking intellectual activity and
as a producer of information upon which our technological so-
ciety is based, is a fundamental component of western culture,
particularly that of the United States." As a definition of sci-
ence, Dr. Joshua Lederberg, a Nobel laureate, has suggested
the following:
The profession of science is the search for truths about
the natural world; more precisely it seeks verifiable gener-
alizations that simplify human comprehension and pre-
diction of natural phenomena. Still more must be said:
the truths must be novel and significant - which is to
suggest that they are measured according to their impact
on the minds of other scientists, a statement which labels
science firmly as a human and social enterprise-s"
34. Favre & McKinnon, The New Prometheus: Will Scientific Inquiry Be Bound
by the Chains of Government Regulation?, 19 Duq. L. Rev. 651, 712-27 (1981) [here-
inafter cited as Prometheus].
35. Lederberg, The Freedoms and the Control of Science: Notes from the Ivory
Tower, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 596, 599 (1972). Dr. Lederberg received the Nobel Prize for
Medicine in 1958. With a slightly different focus, Ralph E. Lapp described science:
The goals of science focus upon the exploration of the unknown and the
enlargement of knowledge. Very often the greatest discoveries come when a
man sees relationships between things which no one recognized before--or
sees these in a new light. But usually science expands into the unknown like
a huge amoeba, moving first this way and then that, seeking the virgin and
the fertile. Its goals are determined by opportunity and chance and some-
times by design.
R. Lapp., The New Priesthood 1-2 (1965).
[Vol. 3
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Science is, in the first instance, the creative use of individual
minds.3 6 As with many creative activities, breakthroughs are
unpredictable; new developments do not arrive like completed
cars at the end of the assembly line. Likewise, it is impossible
to know, in advance, which individuals will produce useful
new insights about nature. Therefore, to maximize the "out
put" of science there should be minimal, if any, control on
who is a scientist or what issues he or she might pursue.
Freedom to research, freedom to choose the topic of re-
search, freedom to choose the method of research, all of these
are essential to the individual scientist. This author and
others have previously argued that scientific research in gen-
eral is so important that it is protected by the U.S. Constitu-
tion from unwarranted government intervention.3 7 The basis
of this constitutional protection would be either as a compo-
nent of free speech under the first amendment, or as a funda-
mental right. One author has argued that because the basic
attribute of science is the expression of ideas and opinions,
scientific research is pure speech.38 It may be more useful to
bring the research aspects of science within the scope of con-
stitutional protection as a necessary incident to speech or as
"speech plus".3 9
From another perspective, scientific inquiry can be con-
sidered as a fundamental right standing alone. Other rights
have been recognized by the Supreme Court as fundamental
even though not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution."
36. See J. Bronowski, Science and Human Values 13-15 (1965). See generally J.
Bronowski, The Origins of Knowledge and Imagination (1978); T. Kuhn, The Struc-
ture of Scientific Revolution (1969).
37. Prometheus, supra note 34, at 651. See also Delgado & Millen, God, Galileo
and Government: Toward Constitutional Protection for Scientific Inquiry, 53 Wash.
L. Rev. 349 (1978); Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A Constitutional
Analysis, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1203 (1977).
38. See Davidson, First Amendment Protection for Biomedical Research, 19
Ariz. L. Rev. 893, 896-907 (1977).
39. Prometheus, supra note 34, at 668-85.
40. These rights would include: (a) the right to privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), (b) family rights, Moore v.
City of New East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), (c) the right to vote and have one's
vote be worth as much as another's, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
19861
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Supporting this idea is a historical argument that the activi-
ties of scientific inquiry were considered of the highest stature
during the period of the adoption of the Constitution and con-
tinue to be of the highest importance in today's society."
Given that the activities of science and individual scien-
tists receive some level of constitutional protection, is it possi-
ble for society to interfere with their use of animals in the
laboratory? The answer is yes. No right, not even a funda-
mental right, is without limitations.4 2 To give research the sta-
tus of a constitutionally protected activity means only that in
order to regulate it, the government must bear the burden of
proving the existence of an overriding social interest.4" If a
scientist is an observer of distant stars, it is difficult to imag-
ine any social interest which would justify an interference
with that scientific activity. If another scientist wishes to do
research on the spread of bubonic plague bacillus among ur-
ban populations, the risk to human health would justify gov-
ernment restrictions. Finally, if a scientist uses live subjects in
an experiment which creates a risk of pain and suffering for
the subject, then some form of government restraint will be
justified. Presuming for the moment that a concern for the
pain and suffering of animals is an appropriate one for our
government to assert, the parameters of possible government
regulation remain to be determined.
It should be noted that persons who engage in product
41. Prometheus, supra note 34 at, 707-29.
42. For example, the first amendment clearly provides for the right of individu-
als to petition the government as a fundamental right yet the Supreme Court has
always recognized that limits to this right exist:
Although the values in the right of petition as an important aspect of
self-government are beyond question, it does not follow that the Framers of
the First Amendment believed that the Petition Clause provided absolute
immunity from damages for liable....
Nor do the Court's decisions interpreting the Petition Clause in contexts
other than defamation indicate that the right to petition is absolute. For ex-
ample, filing a complaint in court is a form of petitioning activity; but "base-
less litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition."
McDonald v. Smith, 105 S. Ct. 2787, 2790-91 (1985).
43. Without such constitutional protection any law passed by Congress would be
presumed to be lawful and the burden of proving a particular restriction unconstitu-
tional would be on those individuals seeking to overturn the law.
(Vol. 3
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testing are not engaging in the constitutionally protected ac-
tivities of scientific inquiry and therefore may be regulated as
any other activity in the United States. This distinction can
be made on the basis of the underlying purpose of the activ-
ity. The purpose of testing is not to obtain new insight con-
cerning the fundamental principles of the universe. Rather, a
"test" is an activity seeking a specific bit of information con-
cerning a characteristic or purity or effect of a particular sub-
stance. Often they are performed because of legal require-
ments.44 For example, monkeys are given the polio vaccine to
determine the safety of a particular batch of vaccine.46 Even
though the test is carried out using principles of scientific ex-
perimentation, it is not scientific activity, i.e. drug safety, not
scientific discovery, is the motivation for the activity. Since
testing does not have the same purpose as scientific research,
it is not protected as a fundamental activity. Congress may
regulate testing as it does the transportation of animals46 or
the slaughter of animals.' 7 The public interest in protecting
animals from pain and suffering becomes the dominant inter-
est, shifting the burden of showing no alternative to those who
wish to use animals.
IV. Ethical Concern for Animal
Because of the lack of a centralized data collection point,
it is difficult to estimate the total number of laboratory ani-
mals used in the United States. Part of the problem is that
the vast majority of animals used in research are specifically
bred for these purposes by private, profit making companies
who do not reveal their sales data. The 1983 report under the
federal Animal Welfare Act shows a total of 1,680,242 animals
being used, but this includes only activities covered by the
44. See generally Reagan, Federal Regulation of Testing with Laboratory Ani-
mals: Future Decisions 3 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 165 (1986).
45. A. Rowan, Of Mice, Models, & Men: A Critical Evaluation of Animal Re-
search 117-20 (1984).
46. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a) (Supp. III 1985).
47. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (1982).
19861
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act, and excludes rats, mice and birds. 8 (It does show 54,926
primates being used in experimentation, but this number may
be a little high.) One experienced author estimates that sev-
enty million animals are used each year.49 While some animals
are used in more than one experiment, most are killed at the
end of an experiment or test.
The uses made of these animals defy the imagination of
average people. Since there is almost no legal limitation on
the use of animals by scientists, every possible use is made of
them. They are shocked by electricity, poisoned, burned, in-
jected with hormones, separated, radiated, restrained, cut up,
48. Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Animal
Welfare Enforcement FY 1983 10 (Mar. 1984) (report of the Secretary of Agriculture
to the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives). This
report is required by the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2157. (1982 & Supp.
1985).
49. The following tables are found in A. Rowan, supra note 45, at 71:
TABLE 5.6
ESTIMATED LABORATORY ANIMAL USE
Mice 45 million 63.1%
Rats 15 million 21.0
Hamsters 1 million 1.4
Guinea pigs 1 million 1.4
Rabbits 750,000 1.1
Dogs 250,000 0.4
Cats 100,000 0.1
Primates 25,000 0.04
Ungulates 200,000 0.3
Birds 5 million 7.0
Frogs 3 million 4.2
Total 71.325 million 100.0%
SOURCE: Compiled from available data, excluding ILAR Survey.
TABLE 5.7
LABORATORY ANIMAL USE
Percentage Number (in millions)
Teaching programs 8 5.7
Research programs 40 28.5
Toxicology programs 20 14.3
Drug development programs 26 18.5
Other programs 6 4.3
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol3/iss2/1
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and any number of other actions5" which in any other setting,
would constitute torture and violate most state cruelty laws.5 1
The three examples at the beginning of this article are but a
few of the many that could be cited. 52 Not only are innumera-
ble animals subjected to pain and suffering, but the United
States taxpayer pays a substantial portion of the cost for such
research.s
The fact that numerous such experiments are conducted
annually makes it obvious that specific individuals have de-
cided that it is morally and ethically appropriate to engage in
research which results in the pain and suffering of animals. (It
should be noted that not all animal research results in pain
and suffering. Likewise, not all scientists support some of the
painful research done by others.) Criticism by one scientist of
the ethics of another has seldom occurred and when it has oc-
curred there has been little change.
There are three issues which need to be addressed: (1) Is
the use of animals in research ethically acceptable? (2) If
there are situations where it is not acceptable, should society
impose restrictions by the adoption of laws? (3) If some re-
50. Examine any primary scientific publication which reports research and focus
on the animals and their use as set out by the protocol rather than the results of the
experiment. Summaries of a number of experiments can be found in various books
dealing with the topic of animals in research. See Animal Welfare Institute, supra
note 1; D. Pratt, Alternatives to Pain in Experiments on Animals (1980); A. Rowan,
supra note 45.
51. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
52. See J. Diner, Animal Rites: A Research Perspective (1986) (published by
Nat'l Anti-Vivisection Soc'y); Ryder, Speciesism in the Laboratory, in In Defense of
Animals 77-88 (P. Singer ed. 1985); A. Rowan, supra note 45, at 163-85.
53. Records are not kept on government expenditure for animal research, how-
ever, the scope of such expenditures is indicated by biomedical research spending.
Approximately $9 billion worth of biomedical research is conducted an-
nually in the United States. The major, single source of funding is the Na-
tional Institutes of Health (NIH), which supported $3.55 billion worth of re-
search in 1981. The Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration
supported a further $1.05 billion, while the rest of the Federal government
allocated an estimated $1.5 billion to $2 billion. Private industry accounted
for a further $2 billion to $2.5 billion, while nonprofit groups (such as private
foundations and universities) accounted for a further $0.4 billion to $0.6
billion,
A. Rowan, supa note 45, at 21.
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strictions are appropriate, how might they be drafted in order
to comply with the limits of the Constitution?
There are a number of suggestions concerning an ethical
system that takes into account the interests of animals."' My
argument and the thoughts which flow from it are within the
mainstream of these various suggestions. The initial premise
is that animals share an evolutionary tie with humans. There
is a similarity in body and brain between the human animal
and non-human animals that correlates with the evolutionary
closeness of a species with homo sapiens." In short, animals
are alive in the same sense we are. Being alive, each individual
animal has specific interests or preferences of activities. Ani-
mals eat, sleep, play, kill and engage in other behavior or ac-
tivities in accordance with their individual interests or prefer-
ences. A second premise is that animals feel pain in the same
general sense that humans do. This premise is based upon the
science of neurobiology 6 and the common experience of ob-
serving animals that become hurt.
There is a paradox in which science is trapped. The rea-
son that animals are used in many experiments and tests is
that they are so similar to humans, yet scientists inflict pain
and suffering on animals that would never be inflicted upon a
human. Within the human context, the infliction of pain upon
others without consent is unethical. This ethical view has
been accepted within the legal system. It is both a part of
criminal law and the law of torts.57 Assuming that the pain
felt by animals is of the same generic type as that felt by
humans, should not our ethical system also preclude the in-
tentional infliction of pain upon animals? Are there any fac-
tors which would so distinguish human animals from non-
human animals that the interest of the nonhuman animal in
54. T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (1983); B. Rollin, Animal Rights and
Human Morality (1981); In Defense of Animals (P. Singer ed. 1985).
55. See Favre, Wildlife Rights: The Ever-Widening Circle, 9 Envtl. L. 241,
259-64 (1979),
56. See A. Rowan, supra note 45, at 74-92. See also Pratt, supra note 50, at
11-30. See generally G. Shepherd, Neurobiology (1983).
57. See Model Penal Code § 211 (1985); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D.
Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §§ 9-10 (5th ed. 1984).
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avoiding pain can be totally ignored by humans? I can find
none.
On the other hand, science and the information it pro-
vides to our society is critical to the health and standard of
living of many humans. Often animals have been the key to
providing new insight about the world around us. The conflict
is sharp: the ethical concern for animals versus the need of
science to use animals in experiments that may ultimately
benefit mankind. How should the differing interests be
weighed? Do the ethical interests of animals weigh so heavily
so as to eliminate any use of them by science? I think not. It
is equally clear that their interest does have weight, more
than enough to outweigh the whims of individual researchers
or the desire of researchers and institutions to obtain fund-
ing.58 The premise upon which to build a statute is that ani-
mals should not have to endure the infliction of pain or suffer-
ing for the benefit of science except upon the specific decision
of society that the sacrifice is one that is necessary for the
benefit of society as a whole (as opposed to the benefit or curi-
osity of the scientist).
The infliction of pain and suffering should only be al-
lowed as the result of a rational dialogue made in the public
58. It should be pointed out that much of the use of animals is not motivated by
the long-term good of society but by short-term personal need of the scientist. Dr.
Samuel Peacock has stated:
Research productivity has become the yardstick by which institutions, de-
partments and individuals are measured and evaluated. Indeed, research pro-
grams lend a sort of window dressing to what were at one time purely clinical
departments. Frequently, evaluation is based on the number of publications,
often quite regardless of quality or redundancy. Closely linked with this pub-
lication pressure is the talent of grantsmanship, the ability to obtain enor-
mous sums of money for funding research programs. These programs have
become progressively more expensive with the development of highly sophis-
ticated techniques requiring specialized technicians to operate very complex
equipment....
The survey in the succeeding pages covers many projects of this type,
most of them motivated by the doctrine of "publish or perish." In my view,
this is not science in the traditional sense but rather a kind of scientific pros-
titution in an attempt at empire building within a very competitive
atmosphere.
Peacock, Preface to Animal Welfare Institute Beyond the Laboratory Door at xiii-xv
(1985).
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view. If sound reasons for a particular experiment or tech-
nique can not be articulated, then it should not be allowed.
This perspective creates a burden of proof upon the individ-
ual scientist to justify their use of animals. It allows some gov-
ernment decision maker to weigh the arguments of the scien-
tist against the interest of the animals. This is simply the
recognition of an animal's interests by the providing of legal
due process. Since animals are unable to make their own argu-
ments it will be necessary to provide a process in which other
humans can argue on behalf of the animals.
While the ethical considerations discussed above were
without regard to specific species, the proposed legislation ac-
knowledges that primates are a special case. This is for a
number of reasons. First of all, captive breeding programs do
not work particularly well. As a result, a significant number of
primates are imported annually from wild populations to sat-
isfy the demands of testing and research.59 The importation
59.
TABLE 2
UNITED STATES "NEW PRIMATE" REQUIREMENTS, 1981
# of Animals Mortality Net Percent'
Imported 22,454 12 %2 19,759 62
Domestic
Production 8,645 10%, 7,780 24
PICG 4,596 4,596 14
Total 35,695 32,256 100
Less re-exported4  -4,000 -12
"New primates"' 28,256
Percent of total "new primates".
Estimated average mortality of imported animals.
Estimated average mortality between birth and weaning.
Approximately 4,000 primates exported from U.S. annually.
New animals available from all sources.
' Placement of primates by Primate Information Clearinghouse (PIC).
Source: Taken from Wolfle (1983)
Eudey and Mack, Use of Primates and Captive Breeding Programs in the
United States, in 1 International Primate Trade 156 (D. Mack & R. Mittermeir eds.
1984) (a joint publication of TRAFFIC (U.S.A.), the World Wildlife Fund - U.S. Pri-
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process itself is both wasteful of the species and a significant
source of pain and suffering for the individual animals in-
volved. It is not uncommon for adult primates to be killed in
order to capture their young. Further, one study suggested a
sixty-eight percent death rate during the capture and holding
of primates in the source country. 0 Additionally, there is a
death rate of approximately seventeen percent during the im-
portation process prior to their being used.6 1 Thus, there may
be as much as two deaths for every imported primate that is
ultimately used in science or testing. It is not difficult to pre-
sume significant suffering during the capture and transporta-
tion phase even for those that survive and are used in "pain-
less" research.
Second, these animals are all protected as endangered or
threatened under an international treaty.6 2 Yet, we have al-
lowed science and testing to create and maintain a significant
market demand upon the wild populations. The spirit of the
international agreements to protect wildlife would be best
served if this demand were eliminated.
A third reason to treat primates differently is to acknowl-
edge that, whatever their source, these animals are the most
like humans. We evolved from common ancestors. We both
have a social structure and strong mother-child bonding. It is
almost impossible to create a laboratory environment that
comes anything close to a natural setting. (Rats and mice can
be provided with a rich and fulfilling living environment in a
mate Program and the IUCN/SSC Primate Specialist Corp.).
60. Kavanaugh, A Review of the International Primate Trade, in 1 International
Primate Trade 62 (D. Mack & R. Mittermeir eds. 1984).
61.
According to information analyzed from Center for Disease Control Im-
port forms, 5,206 or 18.2% of the 28,558 primates imported into the U.S. in
1978 were dead-on-arrival or died within 90 days of entering the country ...
and in 1979, 3,818 or 17.1% of the 22,276 primates imported experienced
comparable mortality. Mortality rates ranged from a low of 15.3% for all Af-
rican species in 1978 to a high of 25.1% for Neotropical species during the
same year.
Mack & Eudey, A Review of the U.S. Primate Trade, in 1 International Primate
Trade 98-99 (D. Mack & R. Mittermeier eds. 1984).
62. See infra note 65.
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laboratory.) The present housing standards for primates are
no more than a very small prison cell, without the opportunity
for physical or mental exercise. There is nothing redeeming
about their living conditions. There can be a presumption of
suffering from the mere fact of laboratory confinement of pri-
mates. Therefore, they should not be subjected to testing or
experiments except in the most extraordinary cases.
V. A Statutory Proposal
The proposed legislation found in Appendix A seeks to
control animal use in testing and certain kinds of scientific
research. The legislation seeks to be no more restrictive than
is necessary. Therefore, it does not seek to bring within gov-
ernment review all scientific research or even all animal re-
search. Instead, it seeks to control all primate research and all
research which has a significant risk of inflicting pain and suf-
fering on animals.
The proposed legislation, as with all regulatory legisla-
tion, contains six components:
a) statement of legislative policy - (§ 1),
b) definitions of key terms - (§ 2),
c) creation of regulatory authority and granting of admin-
istrative authority - (§ 3),
d) operative provisions - (§§ 4-8),
e) powers of enforcement - (§§ 9-10)
f) penalty provisions - (§ 11).
A. Section 1: Policy
The policy statement of section one serves two different
functions. First, it suggests that the law is constitutionally jus-
tified under three basis: as interstate trade," as a condition of
federal funding, 4 and as an extension of a treaty obligation.6
63. Congress may not only regulate the actual interstate commerce of an item,
but may also regulate the production and ultimate use of an item which passes
through interstate trade. Katzenback v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Tribe, Ameri-
can Constitutional Law 232-37 (1978).
64. Since Congress does not have to give grants for scientific research and indi-
viduals are not obligated to receive the funds, Congress may impose rational condi-
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Second, section one sets out the broad policy which the suc-
ceeding sections seek to implement. In this case there is first a
statement dealing with animals generally:
It is, therefore, the policy of the United States that ani-
mals be subjected to pain and suffering for our collective
benefit only when it has been established that no alterna-
tive exists and that the information gained is truly useful
and necessary.
The second statement deals with primates in particular."
It is, therefore, the policy of the United states that pri-
mates should not be used in any research or testing ex-
cept under the most extraordinary of circumstances.
These broad statements are important because they tell the
administrative decision maker what Congress considers to be
important and what type of outcome is desired in the context
of individual, specific decisions. It sets the tone for the admin-
istration of the law.
The policy statement also begins to establish that the leg-
islation is concerned only with the methods of research, not
with stopping the progress of science in any area. Although
the actual structure of the proposed law would have to be
looked at as well, the courts give considerable weight to what
Congress states as the purpose of the legislation . 7
tions, such as the care of animals, upon those receiving the funds. Of course not all
research is funded by the federal government. For example, the Howard Hughes
Medical Institute announced plans to spend one billion dollars for biomedical re-
search during 1986-1991. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1986, at 9 (nat'l ed.).
65. It was established in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), that Congress
has the power to pass legislation not otherwise justified under the Constitution when
implementing an international treaty. The Convention on International Trade in En-
dangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, July 1, 1975, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No.
8249, list all primates as either endangered (Appendix I) or threatened (Appendix II).
As a signatory of the treaty, the United States has a legal obligation to protect
primates.
66. See supra note 58-60 and accompanying text.
67. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968); see also Tribe, supra
note 63, at 591-98.
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B. Section 2: Definitions
The definitional section provides the contours of the leg-
islation. By examining the definition of "person" and
"animal" a sense of scope may begin. Animal is defined by the
listing of five specific categories: mammals, birds, fish,
amphibians and reptiles. Within these groups, all of which
contain a centralized nervous system and a brain, the percep-
tion of pain and suffering is of the same general nature as
what we humans experience. To the extent that science pro-
vides us with the information that others within the animal
kingdom are also subject to the infliction of pain and suffer-
ing, then the list should be expanded. The list also may reflect
a judgement about how far protections can be extended, not
as a matter of science but as a matter of political reality.
The definition of "person" does not provide any limit to
the application of the law. The definition is all inclusive. The
only limiting factor will be what acts are performed by a "per-
son". In effect, no one is exempt from the operative provisions
of the law.
The definitions of pain and suffering are not to be judged
by their biological accuracy but by their legal usefulness.
There is significant debate as to just what constitutes pain
and suffering." These definitions give broad guidelines to the
Commission to decide when to apply the operative provisions
of this Act. The courts are always available to correct any
abuses by the Commission in making specific decisions. Addi-
tionally, the definitions try to focus on the important while
excluding the trivial or truly disputed areas in defining pain
and suffering. The legal definition would not include minimal
or momentary pain such as arises in the receiving of an injec-
tion. For purposes of efficiency and consistency, the condi-
tions provided for under the federal Animal Welfare Act are
presumed to not result in suffering, even though an argument
might be made that certain provisions do result in animal suf-
68. See A. Rowan, supra note 45, at 74-92; D. Pratt, supra note 50, at 11-29;
Wright, Marcella & Woodson, Animal Pain: Evaluation and Control, 14 Lab Animal
20, 20 (May-June 1985).
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fering. In part, these limitations on the definition are to as-
sure scientists that the law will not be able to interfere on
trivial or unimportant points. There is enough significant pain
and suffering imposed upon animals to make it ill-advised to
devote resources to the trivial.
C. Section 3: Administration
One major decision which must be made when suggesting
a government regulatory program is determining who should
carry out the responsibilities of the law. Neither of the two
agencies presently involved with animal research are appro-
priate for the new law. The Animal and Plant Health Inspec-
tion Service, within the Department of Agriculture, deals with
the provisions of the Animal Welfare Act. They have been less
than enthusiastic in carrying out their responsibilities under
the Act. 9 Additionally, while they have veterinarians in their
69.
Several examples of the Department of Agriculture's attitude are available.
First, with every law that is implemented through regulation by an agency or
department, there is considerable variability in the scope of the regulations
which the agency may pass. An agency can do the minimum to comply with
the law or it can push the goals and spirit of the law forward by producing
regulations which are comprehensive, requiring the maximum from those
who are regulated. The regulations under the A.W.A. are minimal. They are
not assertive in protecting animal interests; they require only the bare mini-
mum. For example, the law requires the Secretary to be assured that profes-
sionally acceptable standards are being utilized by research facilities, yet the
regulation contains no clear mechanism for obtaining such information. ...
A second place to take the pulse of an agency's level of commitment to a
law is the area of enforcement. Again, the effort seems to be minimal at best.
While the level of available funds do impact the ability to enforce, even at
present levels very little seems to happen. The individuals regulated under
the A.W.A. are given every possible opportunity to remove themselves from
enforcement proceedings. This is not to say that specific individuals are not
trying to enforce the Act. Rather this is a criticism of the burdensome pro-
cess the agency has imposed upon them.
Perhaps the most telling example of the Department's attitude toward
the A.W.A. is the administration's proposed budget for the 1986 fiscal
year-zero funding. They want to repeal the law by not funding it. What
dedicated, forward- looking civil servant would want to become involved with
a zero-budgeted program? Even if the budget level was based more on polit-
ics than economics, it nonetheless tells everyone in the agency that the Secre-
tary and Executive branch give the care of animals zero priority.
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service, they do not have the experience with scientific experi-
mentation which will be necessary to engage in the permit
program being proposed. The other existing agency is the Na-
tional Institute of Health. As a major granting agency for
animal research money, they certainly possess an understand-
ing of the scientific experimentation process. The problem is
that this agency has always been opposed to any regulation of
the use of animals in research. It seems unlikely that the poli-
cies of the proposed act would ever be aggressively pursued in
such an environment. 70
This is a new concern of the government. It is best to lo-
cate it where it has a fair chance of developing some adminis-
trative strength. The best thing to do is to create a new
agency which can focus all of its energy and budget toward
the goals of the legislation. In section three of the Act, the
Commission on Laboratory Animals is created. Because of the
newness of this issue and the desirability of having strong
open public debate, a five member commission is created
rather than having just a faceless administrator. The full com-
position of this Commission can be further debated. What is
critical is that the general public be represented and that the
interests of the animals be represented. Section three also
gives the necessary administrative authority to the
Commission.
D. Sections 4-8: Operative Provisions
Section four is the first of the operative provisions. This
section sets out specific experimental techniques, such as the
application of thermal burns, which may not be used on an
animal that is conscious or will regain consciousness unless
the "person" using the technique has a federal permit. The
list of techniques or procedures triggering the need for a per-
mit may be expanded by the Commission. The government
D. Favre, The Federal Animal Welfare Act: A Legal Analysis § 8.1 (Sept. 13, 1986)
(unpublished manuscript). (To be published during 1987 by Michigan Humane Soci-
ety, Detroit.)
70. It might be considered the old problem of having the fox guard the chicken
coop, but, of course, that is a slur on the character of foxes.
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thus assumes the burden in the first instance of identifying
where it will assert its regulatory authority. It would be an
unnecessary overreaching of federal authority if a permit was
required for all scientific experiments. Those techniques and
procedures listed under this section are not meant to be a de-
finitive list, but rather representative of what might be listed.
Once on the list, the burden shifts to the applicant to show
that the prerequisites for a permit can be satisfied.
Section five goes a step further by listing certain proce-
dures and techniques which are absolutely prohibited. In ef-
fect Congress will have weighed the pain and suffering against
the prospect of new knowledge and decided that the possible
gain is not worth the cost in pain and suffering to the animals
that would be used. An example of this is the use of electric
shock. By its very nature it is meant to produce pain.
Whatever the usefulness of the procedure in the past, it is
doubtful that the continued use of this technique is necessary
for the advancement of science. 71 Again, the Commission is
authorized to expand this list by regulation. As the public dis-
cussion becomes increasingly sophisticated and as science
makes further progress, it is expected that other techniques
will be considered ethically unacceptable.
Section six sets out the provisions for a primate permit.
Any use of a primate, whether a painful procedure or tech-
nique is used or not, requires a permit. Another major differ-
ence from the general experiment permit requirements is that
for a primate permit the Commission must make the finding
that the proposed research will potentially provide essential
information for human or primate health (or deal with lan-
71. The case against continued electric shock experiments, and all behavioral
psychology, is forcefully presented in Animal Rights and Human Morality. B. Rollin,
Animal Rights and Human Morality 124-30 (1981).
[Niot all basic research ought to be sanctified by the "right to know." There
are certain things studied in the name of research that we already know;
there are others that we do not need to know, most notably in the field of
psychology.... This sort of research makes all research look bad, is method-
ologically suspect, can not be extrapolated to man, belabors the obvious,and
can result in no conceivable benefit to human beings.
Id. at 129. See also Dresser, Research on Animals: Values, Politics, and Regulatory
Reform, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1147, 1158-59 (1985).
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guage development). This is a value judgement which, while
difficult to make, must occur before society can justify utiliz-
ing primates. A permit will not be issued if equivalent infor-
mation is available through other than animal research. For
example, information may be available through the direct ob-
servation of humans, or by doing epidemiological surveys.
Again there is a list of ethically unacceptable techniques or
procedures which may not be used in any situation.
Section seven deals with a related but separate topic, that
of animals used in testing. The approach of this section is to
set out national uniform standards which must be complied
with for any testing. These standards, which forbid painful
testing, must be developed and implemented within two years.
The use of live animals in painful tests would be allowed for
an additional two years if the Commission certifies that the
test is essential for protecting human health and that alterna-
tives or substitute procedures are being sought. The imple-
mentation of this section should result in the ultimate elimi-
nation of painful testing procedures, most within two years,
all within four years. This provision may be considered tech-
nology forcing. Congress can not be certain that adequate sub-
stitutes exist for painful animal testing but this provision will
spur the development of new tests. If substitutes can not be
found then Congress always retains the option of amending
the statute.
Section eight is meant to help clarify a confusing situa-
tion. It is unclear how much or what kind of testing or animal
research is done to satisfy government requirements. Nor is it
clear how much is in fact necessary to protect other public
interests. Therefore, section eight directs the Commission to
study this matter and report its findings to Congress.
E. Sections 9-10: Powers of Enforcement
Section nine provides the Commission with the authority
to investigate and inspect facilities as may be required. This
section presumes the continuing inspection service under the
[Vol. 3
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Animal Welfare Act. 72 It also allows the use of trained private
citizens to do routine inspections in certain circumstances.
Section ten is a critical component for the successful
working of this legislation. It provides for full citizen partici-
pation. Citizens or organizations may petition the Commission
to address whether or not certain procedures, techniques or
tests should be listed and therefore controlled. They also have
the right to bring issues of enforcement before the Commis-
sion and to participate in the permit process. This is a critical
backstop for the effective operation of the legislation. It helps
overcome staff shortages or shortcomings by allowing outside
experts to be part of the process. Also, it fosters a full and
open debate of all the major issues.
F. Section 11: Penalties
The final section, eleven, deals with enforcement and
penalties. There is a strong parallel between these provisions
and those of the Animal Welfare Act. Both civil and criminal
penalties are provided for. Both the criminal and more serious
civil penalties (including forfeiture of the animals) will come
into play if any violation of any provision of the law, regula-
tions, or a permit results in pain or suffering to an animal.
VI. The Constitutionality of the Laboratory Animal Act
As previously discussed,7 3 scientific research can be con-
sidered to enjoy constitutional protection. However, a key dis-
tinction must be established between regulating the topic of
research and regulating the methods of research. This distinc-
tion is critical in determining that the proposed statute is con-
stitutional. If the government passed a law banning research
on high speed automobile accidents, it would not be upheld by
the courts. Such a law would constitute an interference with a
fundamental aspect of science, the right to choose the topic of
72. To fully implement an inspection program, more money needs to be author-
ized by Congress. There is presently insufficient manpower to do an appropriate job.
See General Accounting Office Report, The Dep't of Agric. Animal Welfare Program,
GAO/RCED 85-8 (May 16, 1985).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 34-43.
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research. It would be an unauthorized prior restraint to the
extent the law sought to restrain the development of ideas or
the communication of ideas in this area. 74 However, if Con-
gress passed a law prohibiting the use of live primates in auto-
mobile crash experiments, the courts would most likely up-
hold this law. Its goal would be to preclude harm to living
animals, not to stop the gathering of knowledge through re-
search. Science has the right to pursue any topic of its choice,
but it may not use any method of its choice in pursuit of the
topic. Automobile crashes may be researched. Techniques re-
quiring the crushing of primates may be banned. To the ex-
tent that the inability to use primates makes it more difficult
to obtain specific information, the law will be considered to
create an incidental infringement on research. In certain cir-
cumstances this incidental infringement is lawful.
United States v. O'Brien75 was the first Supreme Court
case to clearly set out the requirements which must be satis-
fied before a court will uphold, as constitutional, a law which
has the effect of being an indirect restraint on a constitution-
ally protected right or activity.7' A government regulation or
law which results in some restraint of a protected activity, like
scientific research, is permissible if:
1) it is within the constitutional power of the government,
2) it furthers an important or substantial government
interest,
3) the government interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression (research),
4) the restriction is incidental,
5) it is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
74. For discussion of the concept of prior restraint see generally Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
75. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
76. Id. at 377. In this case the Court affirmed a conviction for destroying a draft
card. The Court held that Congress has a legitimate and substantial interest in
preventing the destruction of draft cards to insure the availability of registrants for
induction. Id. at 380. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27, 47-48 (1976), where
the impact of the Federal Election Campaign Act upon free political speech is dis-
cussed. The government interest asserted was that of a corruption-free election pro-
cess and therefore any restraints (spending limits) were incidental and therefore
lawful.
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the government interest.7
The first element of the O'Brien test requires that the law
in question be an appropriate exercise of constitutional au-
thority. As the discussion of section one of the Laboratory
Animal Act pointed out, the act is grounded in the commerce
clause, the budget power, and the treaty power.7 8 It is unlikely
that a challenge to the Laboratory Animal Act based on the
first element of the O'Brien test could be successful. The
Animal Welfare Act which deals with similar subject matter
has been upheld as constitutional.79
The second element requires that the government regula-
tion further an "important or substantial government inter-
est" before an indirect restraint on a scientific activity is justi-
fied. If a human animal is involved the necessary government
interest is present. With non-human animals the answer is a
little less certain.
By government regulation, human subjects of scientific
experiments are protected.80 Humans cannot be used in ex-
periments without full disclosure of risk by the experimenter
and informed consent of the subject. The protection of
humans from unknown risks is clearly an important or sub-
stantial government interest. Does the protection of animals
from unnecessary pain and suffering also rise to the level of an
important or substantial governmental interest? In this au-
thor's estimation it should be so considered, but the ultimate
test is how much weight the interest is given by the judge who
might hear a case arising out of the LAA. At the moment it is
questionable as to whether or not this interest would be
judged to be important by those outside the animal rights,
animal welfare movement. However, what is considered an
important interest within our legal system evolves over time.
Attitudes change as we focus on different problems and con-
flicts and as more information comes to our general attention.
77. For a full discussion of these elements see Prometheus, supra note 34, at
692-706.
78. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
79. Haviland v. Butz, 543 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
80. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.409 (1985).
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Two examples of recently changing attitudes within the legal
system include the importance of wetlands to the natural ecol-
ogy and the legal status of tenants in landlord tenant dis-
putes.8' Our society is in the midst of awakening to the issues
surrounding animals. Ten years ago it would have been very
difficult to argue that the protection of animals was an impor-
tant government interest. Ten years from now it may be a rel-
atively easy argument to make. A good test of when the shift
occurs will be when the legislation itself finds sufficient politi-
cal support to be adopted by Congress and signed by the
President of the United States. Therefore, a final determina-
tion of this element of the O'Brien test will have to be put off
until such time as the LAA is enacted and challenged in court,
but the enactment itself will stand as compelling evidence
that the protection of laboratory animals is an important gov-
ernmental interest.
The third element of the O'Brien test requires that the
governmental interest be unrelated to the protected activity.
This element is clearly satisfied. The government interest is
protection of animals. The protected activity is the develop-
81. Back in the 1950's and earlier, wetlands were usually referred to as marsh
and swamp; areas without value. The first attempts to protect wetlands were struck
down by the courts under the "takings" argument in part because the courts did not
believe there was a societal interest in protecting them. As science provided more
information about the value of the wetlands, the interest of society became heavier
and more likely to uphold or justify the restrictions on private land owners. See
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 499 (1985); Am. Dredging
Co. v. State Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 161 N.J. Super. 504, 391 A.2d 1265 (1978);
Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); Maine v. Johnson,
265 A.2d 711 (1970); F.Bosselman, D. Gallies and J. Banta, The Taking Issue 155-63
(1973) (publication by Council on Environmental Quality).
For many years urban tenants could seldom force landlords to take care of the
leased property. The common law concept of caveat emptor put many burdens on the
tenant while requiring payment of rent to the landlord without exception. During the
late 1960's and early 1970's there was a substantial shift by society and the judicial
system as to the interest and rights of tenants. They changed from a second class
citizen to legal equality with the landlord. Tenants now have an assortment of legal
concepts to aid them in the struggle for decent housing. (i.e., the implied warranty of
habitability). See, Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, cert. denied. 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d
1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Schowhinski, American Law of Landlord and Tenant
§ 3.16 (1980).
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ment and dissemination of knowledge. There is no support for
an argument that the government's real purpose here is to in-
terfere with science.8 2
The fourth element is satisfied because, although the
LAA is comprehensive within the area of prevention of pain
and suffering in laboratory animals, when compared to the
broader world of scientific research the resulting interference
is merely incidental. The LAA does not seek to preclude a
scientists from pursuing any topic of research they may de-
sire. Instead, it limits the type of procedures and techniques
which may be used by persons in the gathering of information.
The number of absolute prohibitions is modest, for the most
part the LAA would regulate the use of animals in research.
Finally, there is no restraint on the communication of ideas or
theories, that aspect of science of which the courts would ex-
pect to be most protective.
The final element of the test requires that the restrictions
be no more burdensome than is necessary to accomplish the
goals of the law. The LAA does not require federal permits for
all scientific experiments, or even all experiments which use
animals. The LAA is carefully limited to those aspects of re-
search which may involve causing pain and suffering to ani-
mals. The permit procedures and requirements are carefully
drawn to interfere with science no more than necessary. In
this way, the fifth element of the O'Brien test is satisfied. The
law is no more burdensome than is necessary to address the
governmental interest.
Since all of the elements of the O'Brien test are satisfied
or are expected to be satisfied, the proposed law is a lawful
82.
The requirement that the government's asserted interest must be unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression is really only another way of say-
ing that the regulation must be facially neutral; that is, it must not state or
imply an intent to suppress ideas or information. It has been argued by com-
mentators that even a facially neutral regulation may be struck down if it
was motivated by an intent to directly abridge speech. The right of free ex-
pression would be meaningless if the government could accomplish indirectly
that which it could not accomplish directly. The Supreme Court, however,
has shown an unwillingness to examine the motives of legislative bodies.
Prometheus, supra note 34, at 694 (citations omitted).
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and ethically mandated act of legislation.
VII. Conclusion
The LAA as set out in Appendix A represents the next
logical step for a society with increasing concern over the use
of animals in scientific experimentation. The present Animal
Welfare Act seeks to protect animals from unnecessary pain
and suffering. It is as protective as possible while still allowing
the specific decisions to be private. The LAA would take the
next step by making the use of animals in certain circum-
stances a public decision. Passage of the LAA will be signifi-
cant proof of our society accepting the concept that animals
have individual interests which we humans have an ethical
duty to recognize through our legal system.
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Appendix A: Laboratory Animal Act
§ 1. Statement of Policy
Congress acknowledges the important role that animals
play in scientific research and testing. Most of these animals
travel through interstate commerce. Much of the research is
either done by federal agencies or private parties with federal
monies. It also recognizes that animals have been subjected to
significant pain and suffering as a result of human activities in
the laboratory. It is, therefore, the policy of the United States
that animals be subjected to pain and suffering for our collec-
tive benefit only when it has been established that no alterna-
tive exists and that the information gained is truly useful and
necessary.
Additionally, it is acknowledged that primates, as our
closest evolutionary kin in the animal world are deserving of
special protection. Primates are unique in that they are one of
the few laboratory animals for which wild specimens must still
be obtained. Our obligations under international agreements
are to protect endangered species. All primates are listed as
either endangered (Appendix I) or threatened (Appendix II)
under the international treaty. It is, therefore, the policy of
the United States that primates should not be used in any
research or testing except under the most extraordinary of
circumstances.
§ 2. Definitions.
When used in this chapter:
(a) The term "animal" includes all mammals, birds, fish,
amphibians, reptiles, and such other creatures as may be des-
ignated by the Commission.
(b) The term "Commission" refers to the Commission on
Laboratory Animals.
(c) The term "pain" refers to those neuron signals trans-
mitted from nociceptors found throughout the body to the
brain (i.e. the thalamus and somatosensory cortex) at suffi-
cient strength to be considered a negative stimulus and result-
ing in the animal seeking to withdraw from the source of pain.
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It includes both sharp pain and chronic pain. It does not in-
clude such minimal or momentary pain as might arise from
the giving of injections or taking of blood samples. It is pre-
sumed that surgery will produce pain and that animals recov-
ering from surgery will experience pain. The euthanasia of an
animal by a technique set out in a regulation of the Commis-
sion shall be presumed to not result in pain.
(d) The term "person" includes any individual, partner-
ship, firm, company, corporation, association, organization, or
other legal entity, whether foreign or domestic, including any
department, agency, subdivision or instrumentality of the fed-
eral or a state government.
(e) The term "testing" refers to a repetitive procedure or
technique which is used to identify the presence or absence of
a substance or to determine a particular characteristic or ef-
fect or purity of a substance. For purposes of this chapter only
those procedures or techniques which use live animals shall be
considered tests.
(f) The term "suffering" refers to a general state of an
animal where, because of environmental factors, including but
not limited to pain, temperature, lack of proper food or water,
withdrawal of appropriate sensory input, withdrawal from
needed social contact, or inability to engage in normal postur-
ing, the animal would be expected to experience stress, ten-
sion, anxiety, fear, frustration or exhaustion. The housing of
animals in accordance with the Animal Welfare Act shall be
presumed not to create a condition of suffering.
§ 3. Administrative Authority and Duty to Cooperate.
(a) There is hereby created the Commission on Labora-
tory Animals. The Commission shall consist of five members.
The members shall be appointed by the President of the
United States to serve staggered four year terms. The compo-
sition of the Commission shall reflect a diversity of views and
interest and shall have representatives from an animal welfare
organization and the general public. The Commission may
employ a full time Administrator to carry on the day-to-day
activities of the organization.
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(b) The Commission is authorized to promulgate such
rules, regulations and orders as it may deem necessary in or-
der to accomplish the purpose of this Act.
(c) The Commission shall consult and cooperate with
other federal departments, agencies, or instrumentalities con-
cerned with the welfare of animals used in research, experi-
mentation or testing when establishing standards under this
title or otherwise carrying out the purpose of this chapter.
(d) All federal departments, agencies, or instrumentalities
concerned with the welfare of animals used in research, exper-
imentation or testing or having information concerning re-
search, experimentation or testing by private persons shall
provide information and data when so requested by the
Commission.
§ 4. Permits for Certain Procedures and Techniques.
(a) Any person who uses animals obtained in interstate
commerce, or federal money for animal research or experi-
mentation, or the results of animal experimentation to satisfy
any federal law or regulation and who uses any of the proce-
dures or techniques listed in this section must first obtain a
general experiment permit from the Commission before sub-
jecting an animal to such procedure or technique. At an edu-
cational institution or research facility which receives federal
money for animal research, the individual with primary re-
sponsibility for the specific research experiment in question
shall obtain a permit.
(b) Experiments and research using the following proce-
dures or techniques shall require a permit if an animal will be
conscious at any time during or after the application of the
technique.
(1) Application of any chemical irritant, including acids,
to any part of the animal.
(2) The application of thermal burns.
(3) The use of radiation.
(4) The shooting of any animal with a projectile.
(5) Any cutting of neuron connections within the brain.
(6) Any tail pinching.
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(7) Any implantation of medical devices.
(c) The Commission shall add, by regulation, to this list
of research procedures and techniques when it finds that the
application of the procedure or technique is likely to produce
or result in pain. A technique may also be listed if the Com-
mission finds that there is a risk that a particular technique
may be misused resulting in pain to animals, or if the proce-
dure or technique will result in suffering for an animal.
(d) A general experiment permit for a specific period of
time shall be issued by the Commission only after making the
following findings:
(1) There is no alternative technique which will produce
the same quantity and quality of information.
(2) That specific knowledge is sought, not random
information.
(3) That the simplest appropriate biological system is be-
ing used.
(4) That the smallest feasible number of animals is being
used.
(5) That the experimenter has the appropriate back-
ground, by education or experience, to work with the
animal proposed.
(6) That there are sufficient institutional resources avail-
able to support the research or experimentation as
well as the care of the animals.
(7) That the individual has not previously been found to
have violated this chapter as provided for in § 11(b)
or any portion of the Animal Welfare Act which deals
with the care and housing of animals in the preceding
five years. Additionally, a permit may be denied if the
proposal is the repetition of a previous experiment or
research which has already been shown to be repro-
ducible by other persons. The Commission may by
regulation establish categories of research for which it
shall be presumed that further repetition is
unjustified.
(e) The Commission may request such information from
an applicant as is necessary to make the findings required
under this section.
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(f) If a particular procedure or technique using the appro-
priate type and amount of anesthetic, analgesic or tranquiliz-
ing drugs would not be painful to an animal, and if the re-
search or experiment complies with the guidelines hereinafter
established by the Commission for the use of such drugs, then
a general experiment permit will not have to be obtained. For
purposes of this chapter the Commission shall establish guide-
lines by regulatory process which set out the appropriate
chemicals and their dosage level to be used for each species of
animal by sex, age and weight, which may be used as an anes-
thetic, analgesic, or tranquilizer in research, experimentation,
or testing.
(g) In granting a general experiment permit, the Commis-
sion may add such conditions as are necessary to assure that
any animals are protected from unintended pain and
suffering.
§ 5. Prohibited Procedures and Techniques.
(a) The use of the following procedures and techniques or
ones hereafter added to the list by the Commission are unlaw-
ful and may not be used by any individual upon any animal:
(1) Permanent or temporary blindness by closure of the
eye.
(2) Induction of shock trauma by a rolling drum.
(3) Artificial stimulation of aggression.
(4) Sleep deprivation.
(5) Use of hot plates which produce burns.
(6) Use of restraint chairs.
(7) Use of electric shock.
(8) Infliction of pain or distress to modify or control be-
havior unless the animal has the ability to exercise to-
tal aversion to the stimulus.
(b) The Commission shall add to this list those proce-
dures and techniques which they find present a risk of signifi-
cant pain and suffering in animals and are either not neces-
sary because of the availability of alternate procedures and
techniques or offer the prospect of only diminutive new
knowledge.
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§ 6. Primate Experiment Permits.
(a) It is unlawful for any person to use a primate in scien-
tific research or experimentation without a primate permit
from the Commission.
(b) An application for a primate permit shall contain
whatever information the Commission determines is necessary
to make a fully informed decision.
(c) A primate experiment permit shall not be granted un-
til the applicant has shown the following:
(1) That a primate is the only species suitable for the pro-
posed research or experimentation.
(2) That the proposed research or experiment will poten-
tially provide essential information for human or pri-
mate health or will study primate communication
skills without invasive procedures.
(3) That the equivalent expenditure of money and effort,
not involving animal research, could not be expected
to produce equivalent information.
(4) That the experimenter is fully qualified by training or
experience to deal with the proposed primate.
(5) That the institution where the research or experiment
will occur has sufficient resources to assure the well
being of all primates.
(d) The Commission shall not grant a primate experiment
permit if it involves the following techniques or procedures:
(1) Restraint chair.
(2) Separation of infants from mothers.
(3) Electric shock.
(4) Any technique or procedure listed under section five
(§ 5) of this Act or listed by the Administrator under
subsection 5(b).
(5) Any transfer of organs from primates to humans.
(6) Any implant of medical devices, unless for the benefit
of the primate.
(7) The crushing of the skull or portions of the brain by
application of force to the skull.
(8) Any permanent destruction of any portion of the cen-
tral nervous system.
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(9) The amputation of any portion of the animal.
(e) The conditions of any proposed research or experi-
ment including the housing of primates shall take into ac-
count their social nature.
(f) No primate experiment permit shall be for longer than
a two year period.
(g) In the granting of a primate permit the Commission
may add such conditions as are necessary for the protection of
the interests of the primates.
§ 7. Testing with Animals.
(a) No live animal shall be used in scientifically con-
ducted testing initiated two years after the effective date of
this legislation except in accordance with the provisions of
subsection (b).
(b) The Commission shall adopt and publish a list of tests
and acceptable testing procedures 18 months from the effec-
tive date of this legislation. The list may be modified thereaf-
ter as is necessary to take into account new information.
(c) Before adding a testing procedure to the published
list, the Commission must determine that:
(1) The procedure does not inflict pain upon the animal
after the appropriate use of anesthetics, analgesics, or
tranquilizing drugs.
(2) The purpose of the test is important to human or
animal health.
(3) The procedure produces a consistent, useful result.
(4) The appropriate species and number of animals is
used.
(d) Any animal testing which is painful to the subject
animal must cease within two years after the effective date of
this legislation, except that a test may be allowed for an addi-
tional two year period provided that the Commission shall
certify that the test is essential for protecting human health,
that no alternative presently exists, and that at least one pro-
ject for seeking an alternative to the painful test is funded
and underway.
(e) Notwithstanding any other portion of this section the
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following tests shall be unlawful to perform:
(1) Draize eye irritancy test.
(2) The classical LD50 test (as opposed to the approxi-
mate lethal dose test).
(f) If a test does not qualify for listing but is apparently
required by federal law, then the Commission shall notify
Congress as per the provisions of § 8.
§ 8. Government Required Testing.
(a) The Commission shall report to Congress one year af-
ter the effective date of this Act setting forth all of the provi-
sions of federal law which require animal research, experimen-
tation or testing. The Commission shall also include
recommendations as to whether or not the required use of ani-
mals is still necessary or may be modified, given the public
policy of this chapter.
(b) The Commission shall be an advocate for non animal
research or testing or minimal use of animals before any fed-
eral agency, department or instrumentality which has re-
quired or might in the future propose the requirement of
animal research or testing by any regulation. The Commission
shall review and comment upon any proposed federal regula-
tion dealing with animal research and testing.
(c) The Commission shall seek to participate, whenever
possible, in any international organization, or foreign govern-
ment standard setting process or the development of guide-
lines which will require the use of animals in research and
testing and will be binding on United States corporations and
other persons engaged in the foreign sale of any product. If
the Commission does so participate, it shall foster the policies
of this Act.
§ 9. Inspections and Investigations.
(a) The Commission shall make such investigations or in-
spections as it deems necessary to determine whether or not
any person has violated or is violating any provision of this
chapter or any regulation or standard issued thereunder, and
for such purposes, the Commission and its agents shall have
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reasonable access to places where animal experimentation or
testing is carried out or where the Commission reasonably be-
lieves animal experimentation or testing may be occurring.
The Commission shall promulgate such rules and regulations
as it deems necessary to permit inspectors to confiscate or de-
stroy in a humane manner any animal found to be in pain or
suffering as a result of a failure to comply with the provisions
of this chapter or any regulation or any standard or any per-
mit issued under this Act.
(b) Any person who forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, im-
pedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person while en-
gaged in or on account of the performance of his or her official
duties under this chapter shall be fined not more than $5,000,
or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. Whoever, in
the commission of such acts, uses a deadly or dangerous
weapon shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned
not more than 10 years, or both. Whoever kills any person
while engaged in or on account of the performance of his or
her official duties under this chapter shall be punished as pro-
vided under sections 1111 and 1114 of Title 18.
(c) For the efficient administration and enforcement of
this chapter, the Commission shall have the power to issue
subpoenas for the attendance of persons or the production of
documents.
(d) For purposes of gathering useful information the
Commission may require those individuals using animals in
research and testing to provide information through the use of
one time surveys or through periodic reports not more often
than annually.
(e) The Commission may establish regulations under
which specific enforcement personnel of Humane Societies or
Societies for the Protection of Animals can be authorized
agents of the Commission for the purpose of regular inspec-
tions of facilities used by permit holders or other inspections
as may be specifically requested by the Commission. No indi-
vidual may become an authorized agent without proof of ap-
propriate training and education.
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§ 10. Citizen Participation.
(a) Any person, including any non-profit organization
formed for the protection of animals, has the right to engage
in the following activities:
(1) Petition the Commission to consider the regulatory
listing, delisting, or modification of a specific tech-
nique, procedure or test under § 4(c), § 5(b) or § 7(b).
(2) Petition the Commission to investigate potential vio-
lations of this chapter or regulations, standards or
permits issued thereunder.
Within 90 days from receipt of the petition the Commis-
sion shall give notice of its intent to proceed with the re-
quested action or its intent not to proceed with the requested
action in which case the reasons for the denial shall be clearly
stated.
(b) Any person, including any non-profit organization
formed for the protection of animals, has the right to submit
comments and information upon any application for a permit
or any proposed regulation under this chapter. Such com-
ments and information shall be considered by the Commission
prior to acting on the matter.
(c) Except for the granting of a general experimental per-
mit, any person who has been a participant in any of the pro-
ceedings described in subsections (a) and (b) may appeal a
final determination of the Commission to the appropriate Dis-
trict Court in accordance with the Administrative Procedure
Act.
§ 11. Enforcement and Penalties.
(a) The United States district courts, the District Court
of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the highest
court of American Samoa, and the United States courts of the
other territories, are vested with jurisdiction specifically to en-
force, and to prevent and restrain violations of this chapter,
and shall have jurisdiction in all other kinds of cases arising
under this chapter, except as provided in sections 11(b) and
11(c) of this title.
(b) Any person who violates any provision of this chapter,
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or any rule, regulation, standard, or permit promulgated or is-
sued by the Commission shall be subject to civil fine assessed
by the Commission of not more than $5,000 for each such vio-
lation. Each day that a violation continues to exist shall be a
separate offense. No penalty shall be assessed unless such a
person is given notice and opportunity for a hearing with re-
gard to such alleged violation. The order of the Commission
assessing a penalty and making a finding shall be final and
conclusive unless the affected person files an appeal from the
Commission's order with the appropriate United States Court
of Appeals. If the Commission makes a finding that a person
knowingly violated any provision of this chapter, or any rule,
regulation, standard or permit promulgated or issued by it
and that such violation resulted in pain or suffering to an
animal, the individual shall not qualify for any permit under
this chapter for a period of five years, and may be required to
forfeit ownership of the animal or animals in question. In set-
ting the level of a fine the Commission shall take into account
the gravity of the violation, in particular whether or not ani-
mals were subjected to pain and suffering, the person's good
faith or lack thereof, and any history of previous violations.
Upon any failure to pay the penalty assessed by a final order
under this section, the Commission shall request the Attorney
General to institute a civil action in a district court of the
United States in which such person is found, resides or trans-
acts business, to collect the penalty.
(c) Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Commis-
sion issued pursuant to this section may, within 60 days after
entry of such order, seek review of such order in the appropri-
ate United States Court of Appeals in accordance with the
provisions of sections 2341, 2343 through 2350 of Title 28, and
such court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside,
suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of
the Commission's order.
(d) Any person who knowingly violates any provision of
this chapter or any rule, regulation, standard or permit
promulgated or issued by the Commission which results in
pain and suffering to an animal shall, on conviction thereof,
be subject to imprisonment for not more than two years or a
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fine of not more that $10,000, or both. With the consent of the
Attorney General, any action under this subsection may be
conducted, both at trial and upon appeal by attorneys of the
Commission on Laboratory Animals.
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